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The Perils of Temptation: Has the Eighth
Circuit Given Employers an Incentive to
Exploit Employees?
Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of arbitration agreements by employers as an alternative to
litigation has inflamed the passions of many in the legal community for the past
decade. While some champion the use of arbitration as a relatively inexpensive
and efficient alternative to litigation,2 others view the use of arbitration
agreements as a tool of corporate exploitation.3 This Note examines a recent
and growing debate within the world of arbitration that is quite controversial and
has important policy implications. Specifically, the debate centers around what
a court should do with an illegal clause within a binding arbitration agreement:
sever it from the agreement or void the agreement in its entirety?
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In May 1998, Marken Gannon ("Gannon") entered into a Dispute
Resolution Agreement ("DRA") as a prerequisite for employment with Circuit
City Stores, Inc. ("Circuit City").4 The agreement required Gannon to settle all
employment-related claims against Circuit City solely through mandatory
binding arbitration.5 Prior to signing the agreement, Gannon was advised to
familiarize herself with the rules and procedures of the agreement.6 Terms in
1. 262 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2001).
2. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DIsPuTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION AND OTHER PROCESSES 234 (3d. ed. 1999); Warren E. Burger, Using
Arbitration to Achieve Justice, ARB. J., Dec. 1985, at 6.
3. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIs.
L. REV. 33, 36; Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 21-28 (2000); Jean
R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 701-12 (1996).
4. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 679.
5. Id.
6. Id. A provision in the DRA advised Gannon. Id.
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bold print alerted Gannon that the agreement would affect her legal rights.7
These terms also advised Gannon to obtain legal advice prior to signing the
agreement.' Gannon had the option of withdrawing her consent within three
days after she signed the agreement and was informed of the process for
withdrawing consent.9 After Gannon signed the DRA, Circuit City hired her.10
One year later, Circuit City terminated Gannon's employment." Gannon
subsequently filed complaints with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 2 Gannon alleged that
"during her employment with Circuit City she had encountered sexual
harassment, a hostile work environment, sex discrimination, and retaliation."' 3
After receiving her right-to-sue letters from both agencies, Gannon filed suit in
federal court.14 In response, Circuit City filed a motion to dismiss Gannon's case
and to compel arbitration.' 5 Circuit City based its motion on the DRA. 6 The
district court denied the motion and did not compel arbitration because the court
concluded that an illegal clause in the agreement limiting punitive damages
invalidated the entire DRA.'7 Circuit City subsequently filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that another clause within the agreement "served to
automatically strike terms judicially determined to be unenforceable." 8 Once
again, the district court denied Circuit City's motion. 9 The United States Court













17. Id. The district court held that "[t]he failure of the Circuit City arbitration
provision to provide remedies equivalent to those allowed under Title VII and the
[Missouri Human Rights Act] thus prevents Plaintiff from effectively vindicating her
rights." Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 4:00-CV-330 JCH, 2000 WL 1062102,
at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 10, 2000).
18. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 679. This is commonly known as a "severance"
provision.
19. Id.
20. Id. The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation, dissented. Id. at 683-84.
[Vol. 67
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THE PERILS OF TEMPTATION
The issue before the Eighth Circuit was whether the illegal clause
invalidated the entire DRA, thus terminating Circuit City's right to arbitration,
or whether the clause could be severed from the agreement, thus compelling
Gannon to arbitrate her claims.2 The Eighth Circuit chose the latter.' In his
opinion, Circuit Judge Bowman enumerated several reasons for the court's
decision a First, the court found that the clear intent of the parties, based upon
a term of the contract, was to sever the offending clause.24 Second, even if the
parties had not included an express provision to sever the clause, Missouri
contract law "declares severance to be proper in this instance." Finally, the
court concluded that an order severing the clause and compelling arbitration was
consistent with the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." 6
The Eighth Circuit held that the invalid clause in the DRA must be severed,
leaving the remaining agreement intact, and, therefore, compelling arbitration of
the dispute between Gannon and Circuit City.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Basis For Severance Under Contract Law
Strict doctrine governs the severance of contractual provisions, placing
substantial limitations on judicial discretion.27 Generally, a provision cannot be
severed from a contract "when it is an integrated part of the contract."2 "[A]
contract should be treated as entire when by consideration of its terms, nature
21. Id. at 678.
22. Id. at 682-83.
23. Id. at 680-83.
24. Id. at 680. The court specifically cited Rule 18 of the arbitration agreement
in concluding that the clear intent of the parties was to sever the provision. Id. Rule 18
states, in pertinent part, that:
[I]n the event that any of these Dispute Resolution Rules and Procedures
agreed upon by the Parties is held to be in conflict with a mandatory provision
of applicable law, the conflicting Rule or Procedure shall be modified
automatically to comply.... [I]n the event of an automatic modification with
respect to a particular Rule or Procedure, the remainder of these Rules and
Procedures shall not be affected.
Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 682.
27. See S. Kathleen Isbell, Note, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment
Agreements: Beneficient Shield or Sword of Oppression?, Armendariz v. Foundation
Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 22 WHrITTER L. REv. 1107, 1155 (2001).
28. Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 907 (1995).
2002]
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and purposes each and all of the parts appear to be interdependent and common
to one another."29 This idea is contrasted with the idea that severance of a clause
"is inappropriate when the entire clause represents an 'integrated scheme to
contravene public policy."'3  Finally, contract law governs the judicial
determination as to whether an arbitration agreement is valid,' and federal courts
must utilize state contract law when determining the validity of an arbitration
agreement.3 2
When a court interprets a contract, Missouri contract law requires the court
"to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that intention."33 If
the contract is unambiguous, the intent of the parties should be ascertained solely
from the instrument embodying the contract.34 Even in the absence of a
severability provision within the contract, Missouri courts have concluded that
severance is still proper, stating that "[w]ith respect to contracts which contain
a forbidden or invalid provision, our [Missouri] Supreme Court at an early date
declared the 'general rule to be, that if the good be mixed with the bad, it shall
nevertheless stand, provided a separation can be made."'3 a If the illegal clause
can be severed without harming the essence or primary intent of the contract,
then the clause should be severed.36 Severance, however, is improper when there
is an "all-pervading vice, such as fraud, or some unlawful act which is
29. Id. (quoting JOSEPH D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 478 n.76
(3d ed. 1987)).
30. Id. at 1249 (quoting E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §
5.8, at 70 (1990)); see also Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1058
(11 th Cir. 1998); Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1287 (N.D.
Ala. 2000).
31. See also Wright, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1283; AT & T Tech., Inc. v. Comm.
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1986).
32. Wright, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1283; see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
33. Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677,680 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Speedie Food Mart, Inc. v. Taylor, 809 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)).
34. Id.; see also Marshall v. Pyramid Dev. Corp., 855 S.W.2d 403,406 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993).
35. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 680-81 (quoting Kisling v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 399
S.W.2d 245,250 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966)).
36. See id. at 681. The Gannon court stated that:
Where one provision in a contract, which does not constitute its main or
essential feature or purpose, is void.., but is clearly separable and severable
from the other parts which are relied upon, such other parts are not affected by
the invalid provision, and may be enforced as if no such provision had been
incorporated in the contract.
Id. (quoting Schibi v. Miller, 268 S.W. 434,436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925)).
[Vol. 67
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condemned by public policy or the common law and avoids all parts of the
transaction because all are alike infected.137
B. A Brief Introduction to Arbitration
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")38 in 1925,
courts generally would not enforce arbitration agreements, even though entered
into by two merchants with equal bargaining power.39 The growth of commerce
in the early part of the twentieth century and the resulting increased burden on
the courts, however, caused many business groups to lobby state and federal
lawmakers to create laws that would validate the use of arbitration as an
alternative to litigation." As a result of these lobbying efforts, Congress enacted
the FAA in 1925.11 It was re-enacted and codified in Title 9 of the United States
Code in 1947.42
The FAA was enacted "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been
adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts."'43 To accomplish this objective, Section 2 of the FAA
states that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."" Unless the arbitration clause is illegal according to traditional
contract law principles, therefore, the FAA mandates that courts compel
arbitration when parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement.45
Views on binding arbitration in the employment agreement context are
sharply polarized amongst the legal community.' Some praise arbitration as a
"quicker and cheaper" alternative to litigation that allows parties to tailor the
37. Id. (quoting Koontz v. Hannibal Say. & Ins. Co., 42 Mo. 126, 129 (Mo.
1868)).
38. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000).
39. See Stemlight, Panacea, supra note 3, at 644-45.
40. See Stemlight, Panacea, supra note 3, at 645; Isbell, supra note 27, at 1130-
32.
41. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
42. Id.
43. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
44. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
45. See Stemlight, Mandatory, supra note 3, at 21. In Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc.,
the California Court of Appeals held that an employment contract precluding the plaintiff
from recovering damages other than actual damages for breach of contract was
unconscionable under California contract law. 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 150-52 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997).
46. See Stemlight, Mandatory, supra note 3, at 21-24.
2002]
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dispute resolution process to a form that maximizes their individual needs. 7
Others argue that companies "use arbitration clauses abusively to achieve unfair
advantages over consumers, employees, or others."" Initially, the United States
Supreme Court was hesitant to compel binding arbitration in instances where it
was thought to stand in direct conflict with the public interest. 49 Since 1983,
however, the Court has become a staunch supporter of arbitration.5" In Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., the Supreme
Court stated that:
[Q]uestions ofarbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration .... [T]he Arbitration Act
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract
language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense of
arbitrability.5
2
The Supreme Court noted in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. 3 that "[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act
was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, a concern
which requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate. ' 4 The Court
has stated that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, aparty does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial forum."' The Supreme Court, however, has not
said that all arbitration agreements are per se good. 6
47. See Stemlight, Mandatory, supra note 3, at 21-22; Hooters of Am., Inc. v.
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1999); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
48. Stemlight, Mandatory, supra note 3, at 23-24.
49. See Stemlight, Mandatory, supra note 3, at 22; Isbell, supra note 27, at 1133-
34.
50. See Stemlight, Mandatory, supra note 3, at 22-23; Sternlight, Panacea, supra
note 3, at 660-64; Isbell, supra note 27, at 1133-37.
51. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
52. Id. at 24-25.
53. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
54. Id. at 625-26 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,221
(1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 628.
56. See id.; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
[Vol. 67
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C. Severance or Total Voiding?: The Views of the Courts
Courts that have dealt with arbitration agreements containing clauses that
prohibit statutorily available remedies have chosen one of two approaches to
resolve the issue: sever the clause from the agreement and compel arbitration,
or void the agreement in its entirety."7 Courts that conclude severance is proper
generally base their holdings on either the federal policy favoring arbitration or
a severance provision within the agreement."8 Courts that have voided the entire
agreement generally have based their holdings on reasons such as: (1) finding
too many one-sided and egregious provisions favoring the employer, 9 (2) the
fact that the agreement is integrated,6" and (3) the improper incentive given to
employers to include illegal provisions within the agreement.6
1. Cases in Which Courts Found Severance To Be Proper
In Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 62 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi noted, in dicta, that a provision
within an arbitration agreement that waived the employees' ability to obtain
punitive damages was severable.63 Plaintiffs argued that the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable because it denied them the right to pursue punitive
damages afforded to them by the Truth in Savings Act ("TISA").' The court
57. Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Serv. Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1286 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
58. Id.; see, e.g., Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 683 n.8 (8th
Cir. 2001); Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1287-88 (N.D. Ala.
2000); Etokie v. Carmax Auto Superstores, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 390, 395 (D. Md.
2000); Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026,1033 (S.D. Miss.
2000), aff'd, 265 F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 2001); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F.
Supp. 2d 815, 828 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Primerica Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Wise, 456 S.E.2d 631,
635 (Ga. App. 1995). But see Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 362-65 (Utah 1996).
59. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999).
60. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv. Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 696-97
(Cal. 2000).
61. See Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Serv., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1287 (11th Cir.
2001).
62. 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (S.D. Miss. 2000), aff'd, 265 F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 2001).
63. See id. at 1033. The agreement stated, in pertinent part, that: "[t]here may be
no claims or recovery ofpunitive, incidental, or consequential damages as to any Dispute
submitted to Arbitration." Id. at 1028 (emphasis omitted).
64. Id. at 1032. The court noted that the "Third Circuit rejected a similar argument
by finding that a contractual waiver of punitive damages is irrelevant to the issue of
whether the plaintiff's claims should be arbitrated, even if such damages are recoverable
under the statute." Id. (citing Great WeStem Mortgage v. Peacock, I10 F.3d 222, 232 (3d
Cir. 1997)); see also Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313 (2000).
20021
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found that the waiver of punitive damages was not a legitimate basis for denying
the compulsion of arbitration.65 After analyzing the remedies prescribed by
TISA, the court concluded that TISA did not afford the right to punitive
damages, and, therefore, the waiver of punitive damages in the arbitration
agreement did not preclude plaintiffs from recovering rights guaranteed under
TISA.66 The district court pointed out that courts have "severed provisions
which would otherwise render an arbitration agreement unenforceable."'67
Noting the federal policy favoring arbitration, the district court found that "the
waiver of punitive damages, if applicable to the plaintiffs' TISA allegations, is
severable from the arbitration agreement."68
In Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., " 9the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama severed a provision within an arbitration
agreement that limited remedies afforded to the plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. §
1981.70 The district court noted the basic rule that "[w]hen an arbitration clause
has provisions that defeat the remedial and deterrent functions of a statute, the
prospective litigant cannot effectively vindicate [his or her] statutory rights,
thereby making the arbitration clause unenforceable."'" Although the district
court conceded that the provision precluded plaintiffs from vindicating their
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and, therefore, could not be enforced, the court
did not feel that the entire agreement should be void.7" Relying on a severability
provision within the agreement, the district court held that severance of the
provision was the proper resolution of the dispute.73
In Etokie v. Carmax Auto Superstores, Inc.,7 4 the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland severed a provision within an arbitration
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1033.
67. Id. (quoting Jones v. Fujitsu Network Comm. Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 688, 693
(N.D. Tex. 1999)). The court also cited Sims v. Unicor Mortgage, Inc., No.
4:98CV25DB (N.S. Miss. 1998), which held that a waiver of punitive damages provision
is severable from an arbitration agreement even if it is contrary to public policy. Id.
68. Id.
69. 82 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2000).
70. See id. at 1287. The Circuit City agreement placed limitations on back pay,
front pay, and punitive damages. Id. at 1286.
71. Wright, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1285 (citing Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc.,
134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (1 th Cir. 1998)); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991).
72. See Wright, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1286-87.
73. See id. at 1287. The court distinguished Paladino on the grounds that (1) the
agreement was not integrated, (2) the provision did not taint the entire agreement, and (3)
the agreement did not attempt to "contravene public policy." Id.
74. 133 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D. Md. 2000).
[Vol. 67
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agreement limiting plaintiff's remedies under the Americans with Disabilities
Act7S and Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964.76 Plaintiff argued that he was
unable to vindicate his statutory rights and that case law clearly asserted that an
arbitration agreement limiting statutorily prescribed remedies is unenforceable.'
The district court disagreed and held that contract law permits the severance of
a provision if the contract is not integrated.' The district court further noted that
in the present case the arbitration agreement contained a severance provision,
that the agreement was not integrated, and that the defendants were not
attempting to contravene public policy.79 The court pointed out that an identical
provision in Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., which also contained a
severability provision, was found to be severable, and that severing the provision
not only conformed to the federal policy favoring arbitration, but also provided
plaintiff with the opportunity to fully vindicate his rights. °
2. Courts Finding Voidance To Be Proper
In Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Products Co.,8 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit voided an arbitration clause contained in a
franchisor distributor agreement that limited a number of the plaintiff's
statutorily mandated rights under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act.' After
determining that the arbitration clause was severable, the court was forced to
decide whether the entire arbitration clause should be stricken, or whether the
provisions of the clause denying plaintiff his statutorily mandated rights could
simply be removed. 3 The court concluded that the arbitration clause was not
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
76. See Etokie, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 395; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
77. See Etokie, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94. In support of his argument, plaintiff
citedJohnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530
U.S. 1276 (2000); Paladino v. Avnet Comp. Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (1 th Cir. 1998);
and Graham Oil v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 907 (1995). Etokie, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 395.
81. 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 907 (1995).
82. See id. at 1246-49. Plaintiff was denied the right to exemplary damages, the
right to recover reasonable attorney's fees, and the right to a one-year statute of
limitation. See id. at 1247-48. The court held that "[b]ecause the arbitration clause
employed by ARCO compels Graham Oil to surrender important statutorily-mandated
rights afforded franchisees by the PMPA, we hold that the clause contravenes the Act."
Id. at 1248; see also Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (2000).
83. See Graham Oil Co., 43 F.3d at 1248.
2002]
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"a single isolated provision... [but] a highly integrated unit containing three
different illegal provisions."'" Relying on the well-founded contract principle
of integration," the court held that the entire arbitration clause must be severed,
further noting that defendants attempted to use the clause "to achieve through
arbitration what Congress had expressly forbidden.""6
InHooters ofAmerica, Inc. v. Phillips,87 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that an arbitration agreement containing numerous
one-sided and egregious provisions favoring the employer at the expense of the
employee must be declared void and unenforceable. Hooters argued that, by
twice signing the agreement, Phillips voluntarily assented to a bilateral
agreement that required Phillips to submit her Title VII claim to arbitration. 9
The court disagreed, stating, in pertinent part, that:
Hooters materially breached the arbitration agreement by
promulgating rules so egregiously unfair as to constitute a complete
default of its contractual obligation to draft arbitration rules and to do
so in good faith .... By promulgating this system of warped rules,
Hooters so skewed the process in its favor that Phillips has been
denied arbitration in any meaningful sense of the word. To uphold the
promulgation of this aberrational scheme under the heading of
arbitration would undermine, not advance, the federal policy favoring
alternative dispute resolution."
84. Id.
85. The well-founded contract principle is the following: "a contract should be
treated as entire when by consideration of its terms, nature and purposes each and all of
the parts appear to be interdependent and common to one another." Id. (quoting JOSEPH
D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 478 n.76 (3rd ed. 1987)).
86. Id. at 1249. The court felt that ARCO "blatant[ly] misuse[d]" the arbitration
procedure, which, therefore, tainted the entire agreement. Id. The clause, according to
the court, represented "an integrated scheme to contravene public policy." Id. (quoting
E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.8, at 70 (1990)). The dissent
attacked the majority for not determining whether a party could, by agreement, waive or
limit punitive damages as provided by the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. Id. at
1250-51 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
87. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
88. See id. at 940-41.
89. Id. at 938.
90. Id. at 939-41. The "egregious" provisions included requiring the employee to
give notice of the claim, but not requiring Hooters to file any responsive pleadings or
give notice of its defenses; a mechanism ensuring that Hooters would be able to select
a biased decision-maker; allowing Hooters, but not the employee, the right to cancel the
arbitration agreement upon thirty days notice. Id. at 938-39.
[Vol. 67
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In Perez v. Globe Airport Security Services, Inc., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit voided an arbitration agreement containing
a clause that limited remedies afforded to plaintiff under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.1 After noting that the agreement failed to contain a
severance provision, the court rejected the argument that the federal policy
favoring arbitration required the court to sever the provision, rather than void the
agreement.93 The Eleventh Circuit held that an agreement that linited remedies
afforded by Congress fails to serve the same remedial and deterrent functions of
litigation and must, therefore, be held unenforceable.94 The court felt that
severing the clause would condone the employer's conduct and fail to deter other
employers from engaging in similar conduct.95 Further, the court felt that the
clause tainted the entire agreement stating, in pertinent part, that:
If an employer could rely on the courts to sever an unlawful provision
and compel the employee to arbitrate, the employer would have an
incentive to include unlawful provisions in its arbitration agreements.
Such provisions could deter an unknowledgeable employee from
initiating arbitration, even if they would ultimately not be enforced.
It would also add an expensive procedural step to prosecuting a claim;
the employee would have to request a court to declare a provision
unlawful and sever it before initiating arbitration.96
Even prior to Perez, the Eleventh Circuit, in Paladino v. Avnet Computer
Technologies, Inc.,97 voided an arbitration agreement limiting plaintiff's
remedies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9' The court found that
91. 253 F.3d 1280 (1 lth Cir. 2001), vacated by 294 F.3d 1275 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
92. See id. at 1287. The illegal provision required the parties to split the costs of
arbitration equally, denying the employee the right under Title VII to obtain costs and
fees upon winning the suit. See id. at 1286-87.
93. See id. at 1286.
94. See id. at 1286-1287. The court concluded that limiting the employee's right
to costs and fees denied her the remedial rights afforded under Title VII, and, therefore,
failed to serve the remedial and deterrent function of the statute. See id. at 1287.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 134 F.3d 1054 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
98. See id. at 1060. One provision did not require the employer to advance the
costs of arbitration and another provision limited plaintiffs remedies to damages for
breach of contract. See id. at 1061-62 (Cox, J., concurring). The Supreme Court recently
held that an agreement that does not specify which party must advance the arbitration
fees and costs is not for that reason rendered invalid. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000). The court in Perez, however, declared that the
Supreme Court's decision "does not cast doubt on the continuing vitality of the primary
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the provisions "denie[d] the employee the possibility of meaningful relief in an
arbitration proceeding" because the arbitrator was precluded from granting Title
VII damages and equitable relief, therefore defeating the remedial purpose of
Title VII." The court held that if an arbitration agreement contains provisions
that defeat the remedial and deterrent functions of a statute, the employee is
denied the opportunity to vindicate his or her statutory rights, and a court is
compelled to void the entire agreement because the illegal clause taints the entire
agreement.1°
Finally, in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.,' °
the Supreme Court of California voided an arbitration agreement containing
numerous clauses the court found to be unconscionable. 2 After analyzing
various California cases discussing the doctrine ofseverability, the court pointed
out that two general reasons are given for severance as opposed to voiding: (1)
severance prevents parties from obtaining an unwarranted benefit or "suffering
undeserved detriment" which result from the invalidation of the entire
agreement; and (2) severance serves the general policy of preserving a
contractual relationship if doing so does not support an illegal scheme. 03
Generally, the court stated, an arbitration agreement must be voided if the central
holding in Paladino. An arbitration agreement containing provisions that defeat a federal
statute's remedial purpose is still not enforceable." Perez, 253 F.3d at 1287.
99. See Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1062.
100. See id.
101. 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. 2000).
102. See id. at 774-77. The court noted that "[t]he principle that an arbitration
agreement may not limit statutorily imposed remedies such as punitive damages and
attorney fees seems to be undisputed." Id. at 759. The illegal provision stated, in
pertinent part, that:
I and Employer further expressly agree that in any such arbitration, my
exclusive remedies for violation of the terms, conditions or covenants of
employment shall be limited to a sum equal to the wages I would have earned
from the date of any discharge until the date of the arbitration award. I
understand that I shall not be entitled to any other remedy, at law or in equity,
including but not limited to reinstatement and/or injunctive relief.
See id. at 759-60. For an analysis of the Armendariz case, see generally Isbell, supra
note 27.
103. See id. at 774. The court also analyzed California Civil Code § 1598, which
states, in pertinent part, that "[w]here a contract has but a single object, and such object
is unlawful, whether in whole or in part, or wholly impossible of performance, or so
vaguely expressed as to be wholly unascertainable, the entire contract is void." Id. at
773. In addition, the court analyzed California Civil Code § 1599, which states, in
pertinent part, that "[w]here a contract has several distinct objects, of which one at least
is lawful, and one at least is unlawful, in whole or in part, the contract is void as to the
latter and valid as to the rest." Id.
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purpose of the contract is infected with illegality."' If the illegal provision is
collateral to the main purpose of the contract, then severance is proper.' The
court held that severance was improper inArmendariz because the agreement at
hand contained numerous provisions that served as a "systematic effort to
impose arbitration on an employee not simply as an alternative to litigation, but
as an inferior forum that works to the employer's advantage" and because there
was no single provision that could be stricken to eradicate the unconscionable
permeation from the agreement."°
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
In Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., °7 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit resolved a dispute directly involving the severance
debate."0 The issue before the court was whether the illegal punitive damages
clause invalidated the entire agreement, forcing the parties to resolve the dispute
in federal court, or whether the clause could simply be severed from the
agreement, leaving the remaining agreement intact and compelling arbitration.0 9
In an opinion by Circuit Judge Pasco Bowman, the court chose to sever the
clause." 0
The Eighth Circuit began its opinion by discussing the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA"), noting that the FAA was enacted by Congress to "reverse the
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements ...and to place
104. Id. at 775.
105. Id.
106. Id. The court noted that it did not have to determine whether the illegal
damages provision was enough to void the entire agreement. See id. at 775 n.13. The
court noted, however, that severing an illegal damages provision:
[W]ill not .. .dete[r] [an employer] from routinely inserting such a
deliberately illegal clause into the arbitration agreements it mandates for its
employees if it knows that the worst penalty for such illegality is the
severance of the clause after the employee has litigated the matter. In that
sense, the enforcement of a form arbitration agreement containing such a
clause drafted in bad faith would be condoning, or at least not discouraging,
an illegal scheme, and severance would be disfavored unless it were for some
other reason in the interests of justice.
Id.
107. 262 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2001).
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arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.""' The
appellate court also noted that the FAA manifests a "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements."".2  The court stated that its role was to
determine "whether the parties have entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate
and, if so, whether the existing dispute falls under the coverage of the
agreement."".3 If both requirements are satisfied, then the FAA mandates the
court to compel arbitration." 4
The parties did not dispute that the DRA covered the dispute, and Circuit
City did not contest the district court's finding that the punitive damages clause
was illegal." 5 The threshold question before the court, therefore, was whether
the parties had entered into a valid arbitration agreement." 6 Circuit City argued
that the DRA and Missouri contract law clearly established that the illegal term
should be severed from the agreement.1 7 Gannon argued that the invalid clause
tainted the entire agreement and that public policy thus required that the entire
agreement be declared unenforceable." Gannon's argument was rejected by the
majority and the court held that the proper remedy, according to Missouri
contract law and federal policy, was severance of the illegal provision." 9
In support of its holding that the provision should be severed, the Eighth
Circuit concluded that severance was required by Missouri contract law.2 0
Under Missouri contract law, a court must determine the intent of the parties
when interpreting a contract,' and the court concluded that in this case the
intent of the parties was unambiguously stated in Rule 18 of the Circuit City
arbitration agreement." That provision clearly stated that any invalid terms
111. Id. at 679 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,24
(1991)).
112. Id. at 680 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See id. The district court recognized that "punitive damages act as an
important deterrent to employers who might otherwise discriminate on unlawful bases."
Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 4:00-CV-330 JCH, 2000 WL 1062102, at *3
(E.D. Mo. July 10, 2000). Because the denial of punitive damages failed to "effectively
vindicate [plaintiff's] rights" provided by statute, the court found the punitive damages
clause to be illegal. See id.
116. Gannon., 262 F.3d at 680.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 681-83.
120. See id. at 680-81.
121. See id. at 680.
122. See id.; supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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should be severed from the agreement and that the parties should resolve their
dispute by arbitrating under the remaining terms.-'
Even if the DRA had not contained a severance clause, the court believed
that Missouri contract law still required the severance of the illegal provision
rather than voiding the entire agreement." Citing Kisling v. MFA Mutual
Insurance Co., 5 and Schibi v. Miller,"6 the court concluded that the "essence
of the contract. e . [is] to settle their employment disputes through binding
arbitration."" 7 Thus, the punitive damages clause functioned as one aspect of
the DRA "and can be severed without disturbing the primary intent of the parties
to arbitrate their disputes.""' 8
The court also rejected Gannon's public policy arguments. Gannon argued
that public policy required that the entire DRA be invalidated. 9 She asserted
that the clause fell under an exception to severance under Missouri contract
law. 31 Specifically, Gannon argued that the clause tainted or infected the entire
agreement and rendered the entire agreement unenforceable."' Gannon further
argued that failure by the court to sever the agreement would encourage
employers to fill their agreements with illegal terms because "employees will be
forced either to arbitrate under the unfair terms or to go to court to get them
removed from the agreement.""' In this way, Gannon argued, severance
provides an incentive to employers to engage in inappropriate conduct.-3-
The court disagreed with Gannon's arguments, concluding that the illegal
provision did not taint the entire agreement." Citing Hooters ofAmerica, Inc.
v. Phillips,13 the court conceded that in certain instances, agreements may
contain numerous invalid provisions that would undermine the legitimacy of the
entire agreement." 6 Still, the court found that the DRA in the present case did
123. See Gannon, 262 F.3d at 680.
124. Id. at 680-81.
125. 399 S.W.2d 245, 250 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); see supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
126. 268 S.W. 434, 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1925); see supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
127. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 681.
128. Id.
129. See id.





135. 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999).
136. See Gannon, 262 F.3d at 681.
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not contain numerous invalid provisions.'37 Further, the court questioned
whether the provision at issue was invalid. After noting that Circuit City had not
appealed the invalidation of the provision, the court stated that there was no
existing precedent that would invalidate such a provision anyway.38 The court's
survey of Missouri law discovered that "Missouri courts have not suggested that
it is improper for parties to include such terms in their contracts.' ' 39 Therefore,
because public policy exceptions require "supporting legal authority," and
because there was no such authority, the court was forced to reject Gannon's
public policy argument."4
The court concluded its opinion by addressing what it referred to as
Gannon's "general public-policy arguments." " ' The court noted that the FAA
limited its review to "whether a dispute is properly arbitrable." 42 The court did
not have the authority to consider "public-policy advantages or disadvantages
resulting from the enforcement of the agreement."'43 This is even more true
"where controlling federal public policy has already been firmly established."'"
Specifically, Congress' purpose behind the act was to enforce voluntary
agreements between parties. 4 This objective requires courts to "rigorously
enforce agreements to arbitrate."'" The court stated that:
[i]fwe were to hold entire arbitration agreements unenforceable every
time a particular term is held invalid, it would discourage parties from
forming contracts under the FAA and severely chill parties from
structuring their contracts in the most efficient manner for fear that











145. See id. The Supreme Court has stated that "the preeminent concern of
Congress in passing the [FAA] was to enforce private agreements into which parties had
entered, a concern which requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,625-26 (1985)
(quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
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Deterring parties from forming contracts with arbitration provisions under the
FAA would function as the direct "antithesis of the 'liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements." ' "48 Also, because Gannon had evinced her
intent to resolve disputes through binding arbitration by signing the DRA, 49 the
court found that severing the invalid clause not only coincided with federal
policy but also with Gannon's intent because "excluding the provision only
allows her the opportunity to arbitrate her claims under more favorable terms
than those to which she agreed."1 50
B. The Dissent
The Honorable Harold D. Vietor dissented from the majority opinion.'
Judge Vietor concluded that the punitive damages provision was in direct
violation of public policy.5 Judge Vietor argued that the "near-eradication of
substantive recovery rights enacted by Congress and the Missouri legislature is
... unconscionable." 53 Citing Perez v. Globe Airport Security Services, Inc.,
Judge Vietor concluded that severance was an improper resolution and that the
148. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983)). The court disagreed with Gannon's argument that severance would
encourage employers to include illegal provisions. See id. at n.7. The court pointed out
that the present dispute had led to several months of "time-consuming and expensive
litigation for both sides." Id. The court quoted the United States Supreme Court, which
stated, "by agreeing to arbitrate, a party trades the procedures and opportunity for review
of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration." Id.
(quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court further noted that the present dispute had deprived
Circuit City of the benefits of arbitration, and, therefore, these "forfeitures belie the
argument that severance encourages employers to insertproblematic terms that likely will
result in litigation." Id.
149. Id. at 682.
150. Id. at 682-83. The court also noted that the Eleventh Circuit in Perez had
recognized the arguments presented by Gannon and the dissent, but disagreed with the
Eleventh Circuit insofar as they based those arguments upon a public policy exception.
Id. at 683 n.8. The court further noted that the agreement in Perez did not contain a
severance provision. Id.
151. Id. at 683-84 (Vietor, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 683 (Vietor, J., dissenting). Vietor noted that the punitive damages
clause "takes away all but $5,000 of the $300,000 maximum recovery available under
Title VII." Id. (Vietor, J., dissenting). Vietor also noted that the Missouri Human Rights
Act places no limits on punitive damages. Id. (Vietor, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Vietor, J., dissenting).
154. 253 F.3d 1280 (1 th Cir. 2001), vacated by 294 F.3d 1275 (1 lth Cir. 2002).
The Perez court held that "[a]n arbitration agreement containing provisions that defeat
a federal statute's remedial purpose is ... not enforceable." Id. at 1287.
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entire agreement should be held unenforceable.'55  Further, Judge Vietor
addressed the majority's concern regarding the discouragement of parties to form
contracts under the FAA.' The term in the DRA, according to Judge Vietor,
was not a "procedural provision or a minor term of any sort." '157 Judge Vietor
concluded that the term:
[G]uts a major substantive remedy that Congress and the Missouri
legislature chose to provide to employees. It is a term that seeks to
drastically change the substantive law (in favor of the employer) that
is to be applied in the arbitration process. 58
V. COMMENT
In Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that severance of the punitive damages clause in the DRA was the proper
resolution of the parties' dispute.' 59  The court, in reaching this holding,
disagreed with the courts that have held that a clause denying an employee
remedial rights afforded by statute taints the entire agreement and, therefore,
renders the agreement unenforceable. 60 While the court's holding is reasonable
under the specific facts of the case, differing factual scenarios may require the
court to deviate from the holding to better accommodate the interests of justice.
First, the court held that the intent of the parties, based upon a term in the
agreement, was to sever the illegal clause.' While this conclusion, read in light
155. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 684 (Vietor, J., dissenting)..
156. Id. (Vietor, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Vietor, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Vietor, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 683.
160. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text; Margaret M. Harding, The
Redefinition of Arbitration by Those with Superior Bargaining Power, 1999 UTAH L.
REV. 857 (1999). Professor Harding notes that:
When a clause restricting remedies appears in an adhesion arbitration
contract, ascertaining party intent is problematic. For example, if an
employer inserts a clause restricting the arbitrator's power to award statutory
damages, including punitive damages, it seems clear that the drafting party
intended to use the arbitral process to gain certain advantages over the
employee. It is not clear whether an employer would still want to arbitrate
if the restriction on remedies was declared invalid. Under those
circumstances, an arbitrator would be empowered to award all the remedies
available to the employee under federal and state statutory and common law
ifthe employee were to prevail. Consequently, the employer, now unable to
gain those advantages, may instead prefer a judicial forum where review of
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of a freedom of contract approach, appears to be reasonable, contextually, it
makes little sense. 62 It is highly unlikely that Gannon read and understood the
terms of the contract. Also, as the less sophisticated party in the
employer/employee relationship, Gannon probably lacked knowledge of the
possible range of damages available to her.'63 Finally, the "voluntariness" of the
agreement is also questionable. When faced with choosing employment over
unemployment, an individual will likely take any opportunity presented to him
or her, even one requiring assent to an arbitration agreement, that assists in
relieving a financial burden.
One must also question why the Eighth Circuit, in rejecting Gannon's
public policy argument, came to a different conclusion than that reached by other
courts that have rested their holdings on public policy arguments and have
clearly declared that a "no punitive damages" clause cannot deny rights afforded
by statute.'" Even though the Eighth Circuit determined that it did not have the
authority to consider public policy arguments, other federal courts have
concluded otherwise.'65 The fact that a severance provision was present in the
contract may be relevant. Further, while the Eighth Circuit found that under
a court or jury decision on damages, particularly punitive damages, is not as
limited as it is when such damages are provided in an arbitration award.
Ascertaining employee intent with respect to severability is also
difficult. It is likely that the employee did not even know about the
restriction on remedies when the employee supposedly agreed to the
arbitration provision. If an employee does not know about the invalid
provision, it is impossible to discern his or her intent as to its severability.
Id. at 940-41 (footnotes omitted). Professor Harding also notes that:
When an arbitration provision is declared invalid because it violates public
policy... as with a clause restricting statutory remedies, courts have been
reluctant to find the drafting party's intent dispositive when determining
whether to sever the offending arbitration terms. The unwillingness stems
from a concern that to hold otherwise would unjustly reward those parties
who seek to use the arbitral process to gain unfair advantages.
Id. at 942 (footnotes omitted).
162. Professor Harding notes that "[ilt is contrary to the notion of freedom of
contract to take the position that an arbitration agreement signed by both parties...
should be unenforceable when it limits or restricts statutory remedies." Id. at 947.
Professor Harding argues, however, that "prohibiting private ordering by use of
restrictive arbitration clauses, while in conflict with the freedom of contract doctrine, is
entirely permissible because such ordering is inconsistent with the public policies
embedded in the anti-discrimination statutes, the deterrence of unlawful behavior and the
compensation to persons for harms caused by violations of public laws-policies that
outweigh the public interest in freedom of contract." Id. at 947-48 (footnotes omitted).
163. See Isbell, supra note 27, at 1147.
164. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text
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Missouri precedent the punitive damages clause was not improper, other courts,
including the district court in the present case, have held that a punitive damages
clause that denies remedies afforded by statute is illegal and, therefore, renders
the entire arbitration agreement unenforceable.'
The facts of this case, however, lead to the conclusion that the Eighth
Circuit made the right decision. The only illegal provision, at least as
determined by the district court, was the punitive damages clause. 67 A
severance provision was located in the contract 68 and, as the Eighth Circuit
noted, severance of the illegal clause did not dilute the primary intent of the
contract: to arbitrate the dispute. 69 It is difficult to conclude that the clause
"tainted" the entire agreement or that the agreement was integrated. In fact,
severance of the clause, as the court notes, provided Gannon with the remedial
rights guaranteed by statute. 7
From a policy standpoint, however, the court's holding seems dangerous.
Little doubt exists that employers, cognizant of the holding, may feel encouraged
to fill their arbitration agreements with illegal provisions, aware that severance
will be the only penalty.' Even if an employee is aware of a provision's
illegality, he or she will be forced to incur added expenses to determine the
validity of the agreement.' Courts should not provide an incentive to
employers to include obviously illegal provisions that deny rights mandated by
statute, an incentive that exists if severance becomes the dominant judicial
mechanism.'73 Doing so would seem to "condone an illegal scheme that
contravenes public policy." 74 Although the federal courts do favor arbitration,
compelling arbitration should not occur at the expense of workers' rights.' As
166. See supra notes 17, 91-99 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 115.
168. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
171. See Isbell, supra note 27, at 1148. Isbell notes that "[c]orporations and other
forms of successful businesses are always trying to find new ways to make operations
more efficient, less costly, and more profitable... therefore, it should not be surprising
to anyone that companies will try to maximize profits, even if it is at the expense of their
(former) employees." Id.; see also Harding, supra note 161, at 940.
172. See supra text accompanying note 96.
173. See supra notes 96 and 106 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 86.
175. Professor Harding argues that when courts find tension between the rules
regarding severance and the federal policy favoring arbitration, "a policy seeking to
discourage parties from abusing or misusing the arbitral process should take precedence
over the federal policy favoring arbitration; otherwise, we are left with a federal policy
favoring abusive arbitration practices. Surely this is not an acceptable result." Harding,
supra note 161, at 946-47.
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many courts have noted, arbitration must provide the same remedial and
deterrent functions as statutes.'76 The only difference should be that the dispute
will be resolved in a different forum that best serves the needs of both of the
parties.
A case-by-case approach is the only reasonable means of resolving this
problem. While a per se rule stating that any illegal clause will render an
arbitration agreement unenforceable would effectively deter employers from
including such clauses, it would also deter employers from entering into
arbitration agreements altogether.'7 This negative effect can be avoided by a
case-by-case approach with certain clearly delineated factors to make the court's
decision whether to sever a clause or invalidate an entire agreement much easier.
The underlying inquiry should be a determination as to whether the employer
acted in good or bad faith.' If a certain clause, such as one that denies remedial
rights afforded by statute, has been judicially determined to be illegal, inclusion
of that clause in an arbitration agreement should render the entire agreement
unenforceable.' 79 This will give employers notice as to what they can or cannot
include in an agreement. Other factors that must be taken into consideration
include the presence of a severance provision, the inclusion of numerous
egregious provisions, integration, the sophistication of the employee, and the
inability to remove the illegal provision's or provisions' unconscionable taint by
severing the illegal provision from the agreement. No single factor should be
dispositive and courts should be given wide discretion in making this




While the holding in Gannon may tempt employers to load their arbitration
agreements with illegal provisions, they must also be wary that the right factual
scenario may cause a court to reach a different result than that reached by the
Eighth Circuit in Gannon. Although there seems to be a split amongst
authorities as to the severance issue, a bright line rule seems inadequate. The
176. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying note 147.
178. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv. Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745,
774 (Cal. 2000) ("[t]he overarching inquiry is whether 'the interests ofjustice... would
be furthered' by severance") (quoting Beynon v. Garden Grove Med. Group, 100 Cal.
App. 3d 698, 713, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1980)).
179. See Harding, supra note 161, at 944 ("When a party attempts to abuse the
arbitral process and gets caught, that party should completely lose the privilege-gained
only by its superior economic position-of requiring the weaker party to arbitrate.").
180. Harding, supra note 161, at 944.
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differing factual scenarios in each case lead to the conclusion that the proper
resolution is for the courts to adopt a case-by-case approach. A case-by-case
approach would help alleviate the existing tension between freedom of contract,
workers' rights, and employers' rights, a tension that makes the resolution of
these cases quite difficult.
HADI S. AL-SHATHIR
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